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1 Introduction
Many governments are better informed than the private sector about future
realizations of macroeconomic variables. Often they transparently convey
this information to the public, but on other times they do not. For instance,
the US government’s announcements on current or future activity have a
positive real effect on the economy, confirming the fact that individuals find
them informative (Oh and Waldman, 1990; Rodr´ıguez Mora and Schulstald,
2007).1 But the widespread skepticism on contemporary Argentinean official
statistics provides an example of non transparent and non credible govern-
ment announcements. While there may be different opportunistic reasons
for governments not to be transparent, in the present paper we investigate
whether a benevolent government should always reveal its private informa-
tion on real macroeconomic variables. For the sake of concreteness, we focus
on the case in which the government has prior information on exogenous
aggregate productivity shocks that produce uniform positive (in booms) or
negative (in recessions) shifts in individual productivities. Should the govern-
ment always fully reveal this information? Is it efficient to do so? Are there
circumstances in which it is welfare efficient not to disclose information?
In an otherwise perfectly competitive, first best economy a benevolent
government would always reveal its private information. But consider a sec-
ond best world, in which there are unavoidable distortions. Then by ap-
propriately distorting information communication, a benevolent government
might hope to increase social welfare. For instance, suppose that income
taxes make labor supply sub-optimal. Then if the government knows that
the economy is hitting a recession and does not reveal such information, it
may hope that the increase in labor supply caused by ignorance compensates
the under-supply of labor caused by taxation.
Indeed, if individuals mechanically believe its announcements (if they
are credulous), the government may even be able to restore the first best
outcome through an appropriately over-optimistic communication strategy.
Yet, with rational individuals, misleading information about a recession will
make the government lose credibility. In particular, when the economy is
hitting a boom and the government announces it, individuals will discount
such announcement. This, in turn, further worsens the under-supply of la-
bor in booms, and thus reduces social welfare in good times. In recessions,
1Interestingly, such announcements are believed even when based on false information.
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by hiding information, the government raises labor supply, relative to what
it would be under perfect information, so that it may (at least partially)
compensate for the welfare loss caused by taxation. Yet, it may also raise
labor supply so much, that it indeed causes an over-supply of labor (relative
to the first best), whose welfare costs are higher than those due to taxation
under perfect information. The higher the tax distortion, the less likely it is
that this happens. Thus, roughly, the higher the tax distortion, the higher
the incentive to hide negative information. In this framework, we investigate
the emergence of informative and non-informative government communica-
tion regimes. In particular, concerning transparency we obtain the following
results: (1) there are equilibria in which a benevolent government chooses an
informational policy consisting in being optimistic in recessions, (2) whether
the equilibrium policy consists of telling the truth or misinforming depends
of the magnitude of the productivity shocks relative to the distortion caused
by income taxation, and (3) the range of tax rates for which transparency is
the equilibrium strategy broadens or shrinks with inequality depending on
whether labor supply is rigid or elastic.
We also find that transparency (i.e., information revelation) is desirable ex
ante, but ex post it may turn out not to be feasible, because even a benevolent
government may want to hide negative information. The policy implication
is then straightforward: when distortions are substantial in magnitude and
difficult to remove, the government should find some commitment device to
transparency. For instance, announcements over the economic outlook might
be delegated to an independent statistical office committed to transparency.2
Formally, we represent the government’s announcement game as a cheap
talk game (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) with multiple and heterogenous re-
ceivers. We characterize its equilibria and find that non informative equilib-
ria always exist, whereas an informative equilibrium exists if and only if tax
distortions are relatively small.3 In non informative equilibria, government
2Our work is but a first step in studying the role of announcements made by the gov-
ernment. We focus on the case where the shocks are purely exogenous and out of the
government’s control. In many interesting cases, the direction and size of the shock de-
pend on actions taken by the government. This clearly is the case of many monetary and
fiscal policies influencing the real economy. In this case, the informational policy has to
be jointly modeled with the other instruments in the hands of the government. This line
of research remains open.
3We also characterize a possible partially informative equilibrium, in which the govern-
ment’s announcements are over-optimistic in recessions.
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announcements convey no information. In an informative equilibrium, the
government is transparent (i.e., its announcements fully reveal its private
information) and credible (in the sense that, if announcements have a literal
meaning, this naturally coincides with their equilibrium interpretation). An
appropriate equilibrium refinement uniquely selects the informative equilib-
rium whenever it exists, so that our comparative statics is conducted on the
tax distortion threshold, below which it exists.
We finally complete the model by obtaining the tax rate that would re-
sult from majority voting. We examine the existence and properties of the
politico-economic equilibria such that the information policies and the ma-
joritarian tax rates are mutually consistent. We obtain that the ideal tax
rate is strictly decreasing in income and that preferences over tax rates are
single picked. It follows that the pivotal voter for a majority is the individual
with the median productivity. We show that if the elasticity of labor supply
is less than unity [the empirically most relevant case] the endogeneization of
the choice of the tax rate makes the condition for transparency even tighter
as far as inequality is concerned. An increase in the gap between the mean
and the median productivity induces the median voter to prefer a higher
tax rate and hence eventually violate the condition for transparent policies.
When the elasticity of labor supply is high the condition for transparency
loosens.
Our analysis is related to a number of literatures and open discussions.
First of all, transparency and provision of accurate information have indeed
been very prominent in recent debates on institutional and policy reforms;
to the point of becoming a typical leitmotif in the discussions. For exam-
ple, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced in November
2007 that, consistently with greater commitment to improving accountabil-
ity, it will increase the frequency and expand the content of the economic
projections released to the public.4 In other countries, central banks and
Statistics Offices have adopted a range of methods aiming at improving their
communication.5
4Projections on consumption will be included for the first time together with forecast on
gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation. In addition,
the projection horizon will be extended to three years, from two.
5These include timely announcements of policy actions, frequent public speeches a meet-
ings with legislature, and the regular publication of reports about the real economy and
monetary policy. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England were early
and enthusiastic leaders in this process towards greater transparency, together with the
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The policy emphasis on transparency and credibility has been accom-
panied by a huge economic literature, which, at least since Kydland and
Prescott (1977), has mostly focused on their importance for central banks
(a recent assesment can be found in Blinder et al., 2008).6 Much of these
contributions emphasize monetary channels and assume private information
on policy goals.7 Two prominent examples, among others, are Cukierman
and Meltzer (1986) and Stein (1989).8 We differ from this line of research in
that we emphasize real rather than monetary channels and assume private
information about macroeconomic outlook rather than about policy goals.
As argued above, both aspects appear to be relevant and worth of analysis.9
A recent and important strand of the literature looks at how economic
policy depends on transparency and informational asymmetries, finding that
Norges Bank (the central bank of Norway) and Sveriges Riksbank (the central bank of
Sweden). Finally, The European Central Bank has adopted a fully transparent communi-
cation strategy since it was created in 1998. Geraats (2008) shows that there has been a
notable increase in economic transparency between 1998 and 2002, although the intensity
varied across countries.
6In Faust and Svensson (2001) transparency takes the form of making public announce-
ments more precise. Governments are credible if their announcements are believed to be
true. Transparency builds credibility and, as a consequence, it has become an ingredient
of the common wisdom of policy making (Faust and Svensson, 2002). This consensus is
absolute among central bank authorities. As reported by Blinder (2000), central bankers
consider transparency a “fine way to build credibility”. Interestingly, when asked the same
questions, non-central bank economists are not that enthusiastic about the importance of
transparency.
7A smaller literature (see, e.g., Sleet, 2001) posits private government information about
productivity shocks, as we do here, and investigates its consequences for time consistency
of optimal monetary policy. It should be stressed that we do not deal with monetary policy
and that credibility in our model does not mean time consistency. Rather, it means that
in equilibrium different announcements receive different meanings (so that the natural and
the equilibrium meaning of government announcements may coincide).
8The former paper investigates the central bank’s incentive to maintain ambiguous pro-
cedures of monetary control, in order to be able to surprise rational agents whenever
its policy goals shift. The latter uses a cheap talk framework to emphasize the central
bank’s incentive to make imprecise announcements about its goals, exactly because precise
announcements would induce it to lie (in order to manipulate expectations).
9The fact that central authorities have an informational advantage over the private sector
has been widely documented and it has been mainly attributed to the fact that they devote
substantially more resources to forecasting than private forecasters, and possibly also use
better forecasting methods (Romer and Romer, 2000; Kurz, 2005; Kohn and Sack, 2004;
Athey et al., 2005). The fact that central authorities’ announcements influence private
behavior is also well documented (Oh and Waldman, 1990, 2005; Blinder et al., 2008).
5
transparency may generate economic distortions. We tackle the complemen-
tary question and show how transparency is endogenously determined by
pre-existing distortions.10
While an interesting literature investigates the government’s opportunis-
tic incentives to distort the economy in one way or another, we have nothing
to add to it. Rather, we investigate the complementary question of why a
benevolent government would impose further distortions to an already dis-
torted economy. We are thus closer to the literature on second best, in the
sense that in our model it is precisely the existence of a first distortion what
disrupts transparency and credibility. In particular, the mechanism we ex-
plore is related to the idea that random taxes may raise welfare, compared to
certain taxes, because randomness may reduce the deadweight loss associated
to income taxes.11 The main difference is that in our case uncertainty is not
associated to random tax rates, but rather to uninformative announcements.
We do not investigate here any reputational incentives for transparency.
Yet, the literature on the topic (e.g., Morris, 2001; Ottaviani and Sorensen,
2006) finds that in many cases reputation provides an incentive to hide rather
than to reveal information.
A recent line of research investigates the interaction between the disclo-
sure of noisy public information and the use (and quality) of private infor-
mation. In an influential paper, Morris and Shin (2002) show that noisy
public information, if used to coordinate actions, may lead individuals to
disregard alternative valuable private information.12 More recently, Amador
and Weill (2008) emphasize that releasing public information would jeopar-
10Several papers are concerned by the political economy of budget deficits and find that
higher transparency reduces public debt (Milesi-Ferreti, 2004; Shi and Svensson, 2006).
More recently, Gavazza and Lizzeri (2008, 2009) concentrate on the effects of different
types of transparency in presence of political competition, where voters are misinformed
about aggregate government spending and either revenues (Gavazza and Lizzeri, 2009) or
the incumbent government’s ability (Gavazza and Lizzeri, 2008). These papers show that
although transparency of spending is beneficial, higher transparency of either revenues
or incumbent’s ability may lead to wasteful spending and higher public debt. See also
Barigozzi and Villeneuve (2006), where taxes have a signaling value.
11Weiss (1976) shows this result under the assumption, that we maintain, that utility is
separable in consumption and leisure. See Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) and Sleet (2004),
among others, for extensions of this literature.
12This reasoning has been used to warn against Central Bank transparency (Amato et al.,
2002). Interestingly, Svensson (2006) argues that the result of Morris and Shin (2002)
suggests that transparency increases welfare when public information is more precise than
private information. We find an analogous result.
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dize the price system ability to aggregate and transmit private information,
which could result in welfare losses. We differ from this literature because,
rather than investigating the interaction between public and private infor-
mation, we study how public information disclosure depends on pre-existing
distortions. In this sense, our paper is more related to Angeletos and Pavan
(2009), who investigate the complementary question of how optimal taxation
should take into account the information structure.13
A main contribution of our paper is to reveal a connection between in-
equality and transparency. In this sense, our work also relates to the liter-
ature on the effects of inequality on resource allocation (and growth).14 An
important message of this literature is that in the presence of distortions
(capital market imperfections in most papers) inequality aggravates the mis-
allocation of resources. In our case too, an existing distortion such as income
taxation induces a benevolent government to create an additional (compen-
sating) distortion in the transmission of information. The magnitude of this
second source of inefficiency depends of the degree of inequality. This result
is in line with Esteban and Ray (2006) where the misallocation of resources
created by an efficiency seeking government positively depends on the degree
of inequality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 displays
the government’s announcement game and the determination of tax rates
by majority voting. Section 3 characterizes the equilibria of the announce-
ments game and studies their properties. Section 4 investigates the politico-
economic equilibria. Section 5 discusses the main implications of our results
and Section 6 concludes. In Appendix we derive a technical result and de-
velop two examples.
2 The model
2.1 The economy
There is a mass one of individuals, who have the same preferences but differ
in productivity. Utility depends on consumption and labor: u(c, `) = c− `δ
δ
.
13They propose a tax scheme that guarantees that individuals make a better use of both
private and public information with the additional effect that the provision of public signal
would increase welfare.
14See the survey by Be´nabou (1996).
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The parameter δ > 1 captures the degree of convexity of labor supply, which
is linear in the wage for δ = 2, strictly convex for δ ∈ (1, 2) and strictly
concave for δ > 2.
Individuals earn competitive wages, so that labor income y (equivalently,
production, taken as numeraire) is simply equal to individual supply of ef-
ficiency units of labor. Individual productivity depends on two factors: an
idiosyncratic observable component (ability or human capital), denoted β
and distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F , with
support on the non empty interval [b, B) ⊂ R+; and an aggregate ex-ante
unobservable component (say, being in a boom or in recession), denoted θ
and distributed according to
θ =
{
ϑ , with probability p
−ϑ , with probability (1− p) ,
with p ∈ (0, 1). We assume ϑ ∈ (0, b) to assure that individual productivity
is always positive.
Individual labor income therefore depends on effort, ability and aggregate
conditions, yβ = (β + θ)`β. Labor income is taxed at a constant marginal
rate t ∈ (0, 1) and tax revenues T = ∫ B
b
tyβdF (β) are equally redistributed,
so that individual consumption is equal to cβ = (1 − t)yβ + T . Since the
population is continuous, each individual takes T as given.15 We momentarily
take t as given. In Section 4 we study the choice of taxation by majority
voting.
From our assumption on preferences it is immediate to obtain that, if
individuals could observe the realization of θ before choosing their effort
level, they would choose `β = [(1− t) (β + θ)]
1
δ−1 and produce yβ = (1 −
t)
1
δ−1 (β + θ)
δ
δ−1 . Taxes impose a downward distortion in individual effort
supply, relative to the social optimum, which would require `β = (β + θ)
1
δ−1 .
2.2 The Announcements Game
We investigate what happens when individuals are not perfectly informed
on the true value of θ, but have to decide on the basis of beliefs, which in
15The tax collection per capita T will depend on the realization of θ. Therefore, individuals
will entertain conjectures about their value. As we shall see, because of our assumption
on individual preferences these conjectures are immaterial because they have no effect on
labor supply.
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turn may be influenced by government’s announcements. Specifically, we
assume that information is as follows. First Nature draws θ from the above
distribution. Both F and the distribution of θ are common knowledge. The
government observes the realization of θ and then chooses a (payoff irrelevant)
message m from a set of feasible messages M = {L,H}. Individuals observe
m, but not θ, and then simultaneously choose their labor effort to maximise
utility. Ex-post the realization of θ is observed by all individuals, who are
paid accordingly. The aim of the government is to maximise social welfare
W =
∫ B
b
uβdF (β), where uβ denotes the utility of an individual with ability
β and depends on t, on θ, on individual labor effort `β, and on the labor
effort chosen by the entire population (since T depends on it).
To fix ideas, in this (cheap talk) signaling game an equilibrium consists
of three items:
[1] Individuals map any possible signal the government might send into
posterior beliefs about the probability of a boom. Call these posterior beliefs
µ = Pr(θ = ϑ|m = L) and ν = Pr(θ = ϑ|m = H). Along the equilibrium
path of play µ and ν must be obtained from the government’s announcement
strategy through Bayes’ Rule. We assume that out of equilibrium beliefs are
the same for everybody.
[2] Given posterior beliefs, individuals map received signals into effort
levels `β(m), so as to best respond to the government’s announcement (and,
although this is immaterial, to everybody else choosing the same strategy).
[3] The government maps the observed realizations of the shock into sig-
nals m(θ). The government’s strategy is a best response (i.e., it maximizes
social welfare), given individual labor supply strategies.
Note that since m is payoff irrelevant, there can only be two types of pure
strategy (weak perfect Bayesian) equilibria: a pooling one and a separating
one. Without loss of generality, let the government choose m(ϑ) = m(−ϑ) =
H at a pooling equilibrium and m(ϑ) = H and m(−ϑ) = L at a separating
equilibrium. When allowing for mixed strategies, let ρ and σ denote the
probability with which the government sends signal H in recessions and in
booms, respectively: ρ = Pr(m(−ϑ) = H) and σ = Pr(m(ϑ) = H).16
16As it will become clear in section 3, an equilibrium is non-informative when ρ = σ;
informative, or, equivalently, transparent, when ρ = 0 and σ = 1; and partially informative
when (σ − ρ) ∈ (0, 1).
9
2.3 Voting over Taxes
We have taken the tax rates as given. In order to endogeneize taxes we
assume that the tax rate is chosen by majority voting along the lines of
Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981). Implicitly in
this standard voting model there are two political parties that have to choose
a tax rate garnering a majoritarian support. The proposed tax rate critically
depends on the preferences of the pivotal voter.
Our model satisfies the sufficient conditions for the pivotal voter to be
the individual with the median income. Indeed, as we shall see, individual
preferences over taxes are single peaked and the ideal tax rate is strictly
decreasing with the known productivity parameter β.
Notice, however, that in our model there are two possible regimes, de-
pending on whether or not the government transmits truthful information.
Under a fully informative policy individuals will face fluctuating —but known—
wages, while with an uninformative policy individuals will find themselves in
a stationary situation with wage uncertainty. The preferred taxes under the
two scenarios will be different.
A Politico-Economic Equilibrium is an informational policy and a tax rate
such that, given the informational policy, this tax rate is the one preferred
by the median voter and, given this tax rate, that informational policy is an
equilibrium of the announcements game.
3 Equilibrium of the Announcements Game
3.1 Existence
We first establish existence and characterize the set of all equilibria of the
cheap talk game. Besides the omnipresent babbling equilibria, we prove that
pooling, separating and semi-separating equilibria exist. We provide a closed
form expression of a tax threshold that determines their existence. We use
this threshold for conducting comparative statics on the effects of the magni-
tude of shocks and inequality. For some parameter values multiple equilibria
exist. In these cases, we show that appropriate equilibrium refinements select
the separating equilibrium whenever it exists. Interestingly, we prove that
pooling equilibria (i.e. non-informative government communication regimes)
emerge in equilibrium whenever the tax distortions are sufficiently high.
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As mentioned above, let ρ = Pr(m(−ϑ) = H) and σ = Pr(m(ϑ) = H)
describe the government’s (mixed) strategy; let µ = Pr(θ = ϑ|m = L) and
ν = Pr(θ = ϑ|m = H) describe individual posterior beliefs; and let E(θ|L) =
µϑ− (1− µ)ϑ = (2µ− 1)ϑ and E(θ|H) = νϑ− (1− ν)ϑ = (2ν − 1)ϑ denote
the expected value of the aggregate shock, when expectations are based on
posterior beliefs.
Lemma 1 (Labour supply)
Given posterior beliefs, individuals’ best response to government’s announce-
ments is described by the following labor supply strategy:
`∗β(m) = {(1− t) [β + E(θ|m)]}
1
δ−1 . (1)
Proof `∗β(m) = argmax`
[
(1− t) [β + E(θ|m)] `+ E(T |m)− 1
δ
`δ
]
.17
Lemma 1 establishes that individuals base labor supply choices on ex-
pected net wage, with an elasticity equal to γ ≡ 1
δ−1 . Notice that most
microeconometric estimates suggest a value of γ between zero and one, im-
plying δ ≥ 2.
Let us first consider babbling equilibria. A babbling equilibrium is an
equilibrium in which individual labor supply strategies disregard the govern-
ment’s announcement, and the government’s signalling strategy disregards
the realization of the shock.
Proposition 1 (Babbling equilibria)
For any ξ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique babbling equilibrium, in which ρ =
σ = ξ and µ = ν = p.
Proof From Lemma 1, given µ = ν = p, individual optimal labor supply
is `∗β(L) = `
∗
β(H), irrespective of the government’s announcement, so that,
whatever the realization of θ, the government is indifferent between L and
H, since social welfare does not depend on the announcement. In particular,
∀ξ ∈ [0, 1], mixing with the same probability ξ in booms and in recessions is
a best response to `∗β(m). Given ρ = σ = ξ, in turn, individuals do not learn
17Notice that E(T |m) is immaterial to individual choices, since individuals take it as given.
Therefore its precise definition will be given later.
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anything from government’s announcements, so that µ = ν = p follows from
ρ = σ = ξ via Bayes’ rule if ξ ∈ (0, 1); if ξ ∈ {0, 1}, then the same is true for
either µ or ν, whereas no restriction is placed on out of equilibrium beliefs,
so that in particular we can have µ = ν = p.
This characterizes the set of all babbling equilibria.
Remark 1 All babbling equilibria are equivalent in terms of equilibrium out-
come of labor supply, consumption, utility and social welfare.
Remark 2 No other equilibria exist with µ = ν, apart from babbling ones,
since optimal labor supply is defined in Lemma 1 and any government’s strat-
egy with ρ 6= σ would imply, through Bayesian updating, µ 6= ν.
We now examine non babbling equilibria, in which it must be the case
that µ 6= ν.
Lemma 2 (Announcement in booms)
Given posterior beliefs, let individual labor supply strategies be defined by
(1). In booms, the government’s best response is to announce H if and only
if ν ≥ µ.
Proof If θ = ϑ (i.e., in booms), social welfare is maximum when an indi-
vidual with ability β chooses an effort level (β+ϑ). Taxes and uncertainty on
θ make labor supply (1) suboptimally low, so the government’s best response
is to make the announcement that induces the highest expected value of θ,
and therefore the highest level of labor supply.
It is therefore without loss of generality to let H be the signal sent in
booms in any non babbling equilibrium, and therefore focus on µ < ν. To
study the government’s best response in recessions, it is convenient to rewrite
(1) as `∗β(L) = (1− t)
1
δ−1xµ and `
∗
β(H) = (1− t)
1
δ−1xν , so that
xµ = [β + E(θ|L)]
1
δ−1 = [β + (2µ− 1)ϑ] 1δ−1 ,
xν = [β + E(θ|H)]
1
δ−1 = [β + (2ν − 1)ϑ] 1δ−1
capture the effect of gross expected salary (equivalently, expected produc-
tivity) on labor supply, when posterior beliefs are µ and ν, respectively.
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Government’s behavior in recessions depends on whether social welfare is
higher upon announcing L or H. The essence of this welfare comparison is
captured by a decreasing (for µ < ν) function of t,
Z(t) =
1− t
δ
∫ B
b
(
xδν − xδµ
)
dF (β)−
∫ B
b
(β − ϑ) (xν − xµ) dF (β), (2)
whose first and second term reflect welfare differences due to leisure and to
consumption, respectively. Government’s announcements in recessions will
then be discriminated by the following threshold (defined for µ 6= ν, but
which we need to consider only for µ < ν):
t∗(µ, ν) = 1−
∫ B
b
(β − ϑ)(xν − xµ)dF (β)∫ B
b
1
δ
(xδν − xδµ)dF (β)
. (3)
Lemma 3 (Announcement in recessions)
Given posterior beliefs µ < ν, let individual labor supply strategies be defined
by (1). Then t∗(µ, ν) ∈ (0, 1). In recessions, the government’s best response
is to announce L if t < t∗(µ, ν); to announce H if t > t∗(µ, ν); and to choose
any ρ ∈ [0, 1] if t = t∗(µ, ν).
Proof Let u∗β(m|θ) denote the utility gained by an individual with ability
β when the government announces m, the true state of the world is θ, and
individual strategies are described by (1), given µ < ν. If θ = −ϑ (i.e., in
recessions), we have
u∗β(L| − ϑ) = (1− t)(β − ϑ)(1− t)
1
δ−1xµ + T
∗(L| − ϑ)− 1
δ
[
(1− t) 1δ−1xµ
]δ
,
u∗β(H| − ϑ) = (1− t)(β − ϑ)(1− t)
1
δ−1xν + T
∗(H| − ϑ)− 1
δ
[
(1− t) 1δ−1xν
]δ
,
T ∗(L| − ϑ) = t
∫ B
b
(β − ϑ)(1− t) 1δ−1xµdF (β),
T ∗(H| − ϑ) = t
∫ B
b
(β − ϑ)(1− t) 1δ−1xνdF (β).
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The welfare difference between announcing L and H can be written as
∆W ≡ W (L, `∗| − ϑ)−W (H, `∗| − ϑ) =
=
∫ B
b
[
u∗β(L| − ϑ)− u∗β(H| − ϑ)
]
dF (β) =
= (1− t) 1δ−1Z(t).
For t = 1, work effort is zero for any pair of posterior beliefs and we have
∆W = 0. For t < 1, the sign of ∆W is equal to the sign of Z(t). Z(t) is
a continuous function, strictly decreasing in t and with Z(1) < 0. We now
prove that Z(0) > 0. Given µ < ν, we have xµ < xν , so we can write
Z(0) =
∫ B
b
(xν − xµ)
[
xδν − xδµ
δ (xν − xν) − (β − ϑ)
]
dF (β),
Consider now the function x
δ
δ
. For δ > 1, it is convex and hence
xδ−1µ <
xδν − xδµ
δ (xν − xν) < x
δ−1
ν .
From the first inequality, recalling that xδ−1µ = (β − ϑ + 2µϑ), we have[
xδν−xδµ
δ(xν−xν) − (β − ϑ)
]
> 2µϑ, so that
Z(0) > 2µϑ
∫ B
b
(xν − xµ) dF (β) > 0.
Hence, ∀(µ, ν) : 0 ≤ µ < ν ≤ 1, there is a unique value of t ∈ (0, 1),
which we call t∗(µ, ν), such that Z(t∗(µ, ν)) = 0. Explicit calculation yields
(3). Hence, in recessions, for t ∈ (0, t∗(µ, ν)), ∆W > 0 and the government
strictly prefers to announce L; for t = t∗(µ, ν), ∆W = 0 and the government
is indifferent between the two signals, so that any randomization is a best re-
sponse; and for t ∈ (t∗(µ, ν), 1), ∆W < 0 and the government strictly prefers
to announce H.
The proof of Lemma 3 highlights the interaction between the tax dis-
tortion and the information distortion induced by the government if it does
not fully reveal private information that the economy is hitting a recession.
Given that the true state is a recession and for given beliefs, the relative
welfare advantage of announcing a recession (over cheating and announcing
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a boom) can be expressed as ∆W = (1 − t) 1δ−1Z(t), i.e., as the product of
two effects. Let us consider them in turn.
Z(t) captures the fact that, given the way in which individuals map an-
nouncements to beliefs, the government, by cheating and announcing a boom,
is able to raise individual expectations on wages, and therefore to stimulate
labor supply. When taxes are zero, this is inefficient, since it induces workers
to supply effort in excess of what is optimal. Consider now an increase in
taxes. Whatever the announcement, the tax increase reduces labor supply.
If the government reveals information, then, it induces a suboptimal level of
labor supply. Thus, upon revelation of information, labor supply falls the
further below from the social optimum the higher the taxes. In contrast,
with higher taxes, cheating induces a smaller amount of overwork. As taxes
increase, the overwork induced by cheating gets lower and lower. At the be-
ginning this effect is small, so that, for low taxes, namely for t < t∗(µ, ν), the
government still prefers to reveal information. When taxes are t = t∗(µ, ν),
the welfare cost of the overwork induced by cheating is exactly equal to the
welfare cost of underwork induced by revelation, so that the government is
indifferent. As taxes further increase above t∗(µ, ν), the overwork induced
by cheating first goes to zero and then eventually becomes underwork. At
any rate, for t > t∗(µ, ν) work supply is closer to the social optimum if the
government cheats than if it reveals information about a recession.
The effect of Z(t) is scaled by (1 − t) 1δ−1 . This term captures the fact
that, by reducing labor supply after any announcement, taxes also reduce the
welfare difference between revealing and hiding information. Eventually, as
t approaches 1, labor supply converges to zero whatever the announcement,
and the welfare difference between revealing and hiding information com-
pletely vanishes. Figure 1 plots ∆W against t for different values of ν, given
µ = 0, ϑ = 0.5, δ = 3 and a Pareto distribution of β with scale parameter
b = 1, i.e., with support on [b, B) = [1,∞), and shape parameter α = 3. The
qualitative pattern is analogous for different parametric and distributional
assumptions.
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Figure 1: The incentive to reveal information on a recession
as a function of tax distortion, for µ = 0 and different values of ν.
Lemma 3 helps us understand how the relative welfare advantage of re-
vealing or not information on a recession depends on taxes, for given beliefs.
Yet, in equilibrium, government’s announcements also influence beliefs, since
posterior beliefs have to be derived from government’s strategy via Bayes’
rule along the equilibrium path of play. Recall that, when allowing for mixed
strategies, we call ρ = Pr(m(−ϑ) = H) and σ = Pr(m(ϑ) = H).
Proposition 2 (Non babbling equilibria)
There are only two types of non babbling equilibria in pure strategies (pooling
and separating) and one type in mixed strategies (semi-separating). In all
cases, labor supply strategies are described by (1).
• At a pooling equilibrium m(ϑ) = m(−ϑ) = H and ν = p. A pooling
equilibrium exists if and only if µ < p and t ≥ t∗(µ, p).
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• At a separating equilibrium m(−ϑ) = L, m(ϑ) = H, µ = 0 and ν = 1.
A separating equilibrium exists if and only if t ≤ t∗(0, 1).
• At a semi-separating equilibrium ρ ∈ (0, 1), σ = 1, µ = 0 and ν =
p
p+(1−p)ρ . A semi-separating equilibrium exists if and only if
t = t∗
(
0, p
p+(1−p)ρ
)
.
Proof Labour supply strategies follow from Lemma 1. Since the set of
feasible messages comprises only two signals, there are only two types of
pure strategy equilibria: either the government sends the same signal both
in booms and in recessions, or it sends different signals. It is then without
loss of generality to call H the message sent in booms.
Consider a candidate pooling equilibrium. The government sends the
same message H both in booms and in recessions. Along the equilibrium
path of play, i.e., upon receiving H, individuals do not learn anything and
have to base decisions on their prior beliefs: Bayes’ rule implies ν = p. Then
by Lemma 2, the government does not deviate in booms if and only if µ ≤ p.
By Remark 2, µ 6= ν. So the only restriction on out of equilibrium beliefs
is µ < p. Given this, by Lemma 3, the government does not deviate in
recessions if and only if t ≥ t∗(µ, p).
Now consider a candidate separating equilibrium. The government an-
nounces H in booms and L in recessions. Bayes’ rule then implies µ = 0
and ν = 1. Given this, by Lemma 2, the government does not deviate in
booms. By Lemma 3, it does not deviate in recessions either if and only if
t ≤ t∗(0, 1).
Now allow for mixed strategies. In booms the government is willing to
mix if and only if µ = ν, which is excluded by Remark 2. So, as above
without loss of generality, non babbling equilibria in mixed strategies imply
µ < ν and σ = 1, i.e., they may only be semi-separating. For ρ ∈ {0, 1},
we have the two pure strategy equilibria considered above. For ρ ∈ (0, 1),
Bayes’ rule implies µ = 0 and ν = p
p+(1−p)ρ . Given this, by Lemma 2, the
government does not deviate in booms. By Lemma 3, it does not deviate in
recessions either if and only if t = t∗
(
0, p
p+(1−p)ρ
)
.
At a separating equilibrium the government sends different signals in
different states of the world, so that workers can fully infer its private infor-
mation. This implies that they respond to government’s announcements by
changing labor supply.
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At a pooling equilibrium, the government sends the same signal in any
state of the world, so that workers cannot infer any information from signals,
and therefore supply the same amount of labor in any state of the world,
irrespective of government’s announcements. Observe that along the equilib-
rium path of play of a pooling equilibrium, workers exert as much work effort
as in any babbling equilibrium, since in both cases they respond optimally to
their prior beliefs. The only difference between pooling and babbling equi-
libria is in terms of out of equilibrium beliefs. At a pooling equilibrium,
the government does not reveal information on a recession, precisely because
its unsent signal L would receive a pessimistic interpretation (µ < ν = p),
thus inducing a welfare decreasing reduction in labor supply. By contrast,
in babbling equilibria the government is indifferent between the two signals,
since they are disregarded (µ = ν = p). Indeed, in almost all such equilibria,
there are no unsent signals, since the government sends any signal with a
strictly positive probability, which is the same in booms and in recessions
(ρ = σ ∈ (0, 1)).
At a semi-separating equilibrium, the government always announces H
in booms, but it randomizes in recessions, sending the different signal L
with probability (1− ρ) and the same signal H as in booms with probability
ρ ∈ (0, 1). Thus ρ may be interpreted as the degree of over-optimism by the
government. The implication of over-optimism is that the government loses
credibility, as compared with a separating equilibrium. Yet, since it some-
times sends a different signal in recessions from the signal it always sends in
booms, its announcements retain a higher level of credibility, when compared
to the pooling equilibrium. As a consequence, labor supply responsiveness
to government’s announcements at a semi-separating equilibrium is at an
intermediate level between the zero responsiveness of a pooling equilibrium
and the full responsiveness of a separating equilibrium.
3.2 Efficiency and equilibrium selection
Let us now compare the different equilibria from an ex ante point of view,
that is, when averages (or expected values) are based on the prior distribution
of shocks. Consider first separating and pooling equilibria. For an individual
with ability β, let ¯`Sβ , y¯
S
β , u¯
S
β , and
¯`P
β , y¯
P
β , u¯
P
β , denote the ex ante expected
levels of labor supply, production and indirect utility, at a separating and at
a pooling equilibrium, respectively.
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Proposition 3 (Ex ante Pareto dominance: pooling and separating)
For any parameter constellation, any ability distribution, and any level β of
individual ability, the following holds: (i) ¯`Sβ <
¯`P
β ⇐⇒ δ > 2; (ii) y¯Sβ > y¯Pβ ;
(iii) u¯Sβ > u¯
P
β .
Proof Let θ¯ = pϑ − (1 − p)ϑ be the expected value of θ according
to prior beliefs. Labor supply by an individual with ability β, when the
state of the world is θ, is `Sβ(θ) = (1 − t)
1
δ−1 (β + θ)
1
δ−1 at a separating equi-
librium and `Pβ (θ) = `
P
β = (1 − t)
1
δ−1
(
β + θ¯
) 1
δ−1 at a pooling equilibrium.
ySβ (θ) = (β + θ)`
S
β(θ) and y
P
β (θ) = (β + θ)`
P
β are the corresponding produc-
tion levels; and uSβ(θ) = (1− t)ySβ (θ)−
[`Sβ (θ)]
δ
δ
+ t
∫ B
b
ySβ (θ)dF (β) and u
P
β (θ) =
(1− t)yPβ (θ)−
(`Pβ )
δ
δ
+ t
∫ B
b
yPβ (θ)dF (β) are the corresponding levels of indirect
utility. Ex ante expected levels of individual labor supply, individual pro-
duction and individual indirect utility at the two equilibria are then, respec-
tively, ¯`Sβ = (1 − t)
1
δ−1
[
p(β + ϑ)
1
δ−1 + (1− p)(β − ϑ) 1δ−1
]
and ¯`Pβ = `
P
β ; y¯
S
β =
(1−t) 1δ−1
[
p(β + ϑ)
δ
δ−1 + (1− p)(β − ϑ) δδ−1
]
and y¯Pβ = (1−t)
1
δ−1 [β+θ¯]
δ
δ−1 ; and
u¯Sβ =
(
δ−1
δ
)
(1−t)y¯Sβ +t
∫ B
b
y¯SβdF (β) and u¯
P
β =
(
δ−1
δ
)
(1−t)y¯Pβ +t
∫ B
b
y¯Pβ dF (β).
Points (i) and (ii) then immediately follow by convexity (or concavity), and
point (iii) is a corollary of point (ii).
Notice that, for any parameter constellation and ability distribution, ex
ante expected levels of individual labor supply, production and indirect util-
ity, whose relationships are identified in Proposition 3, are well defined, inde-
pendently of whether a separating or a pooling equilibrium (or both) exist.
Notice also that, along the equilibrium path of play, labor supply, and hence
production and indirect utility, are the same at a pooling and at any bab-
bling equilibrium. Therefore Proposition 3 establishes that, for any tax rate,
transparent and credible revelation of information is ex ante Pareto superior
to information hiding. Yet, as we already know from the previous analysis,
high tax distortions may prevent the transparent outcome from materializing
in equilibrium.
The intuition behind Propositions 3 is very simple. Transparency allows
individuals to work more when they are more productive and less when they
are less productive. This unequivocally raises the ex ante level of individual
production, relative to no information disclosure. Although it also raises the
ex ante level of individual disutility of labor (since workers dislike fluctuations
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in labor effort), this latter effect is always more than compensated by the
higher expected level of individual consumption.18
If we now condition on equilibrium existence, and extend the analysis to
any possible equilibrium, we have the following result.
Proposition 4 (Ex ante welfare dominance)
Whenever it exists, the separating equilibrium dominates any other equilib-
rium in terms of ex ante social welfare.
Proof When we compare the separating equilibrium with either a pooling
or any babbling equilibrium, the result is a corollary of Proposition 3.19 Now
compare the separating with the semi-separating equilibrium.20 In recessions
social welfare is the same in these two equilibria, since in the semi-separating
the government is indifferent between signalling H and signalling L, but in
this latter case labor supply and hence welfare are exactly the same as they
are in recessions in the separating equilibrium (since in both cases µ = 0).21
In booms, in turn, labor supply and welfare are higher in the separating than
in the semi-separating equilibrium.
While it is analytically harder to prove ex ante Pareto dominance with
respect to the semi-separating equilibrium, Proposition 4 adds to the previous
18Transparency raises individual expected leisure time if the elasticity of labor supply is
γ < 1 (i.e., for δ > 2). In this case, labor supply is a concave function of expected
wages. This implies that, relative to the case of no information, labor supply reductions in
recessions are more pronounced than increases in booms. If the elasticity of labor supply
is γ > 1 (i.e., for δ < 2), by contrast, labor supply is a convex function of expected wages.
In this case, transparency raises individual expected labor supply, relative to information
hiding.
19Observe that ex ante social welfare at the separating and at any pooling or bab-
bling equilibrium can be written as W¯S =
∫ B
b
u¯SβdF (β) =
δ−1+t
δ
∫ B
b
y¯Sβ dF (β) and
W¯P =
∫ B
b
u¯Pβ dF (β) =
δ−1+t
δ
∫ B
b
y¯Pβ dF (β), respectively.
20Recall that the separating equilibrium exists for t ∈ (0, t∗(0, 1)]; a pooling equilibrium
exists if ∃µ : µ < p and t ≥ t∗(µ, p)); a babbling equilibrium always exists; and a
semi-separating equilibrium exists if ∃ ρ ∈ (0, 1) : t = t∗
(
0, pp+(1−p)ρ
)
. Existence of a
semi-separating implies existence of a separating, which implies existence of a babbling
equilibrium, whereas a pooling and the separating equilibria co-exist if t∗(0, 1) ≥ t ≥
t∗(µ, p).
21When the government announces H in recession at a semi-separating equilibrium, its
over-optimism induces a welfare loss from over-work (relative to the first best), which is
exactly equal to the loss from under-work induced by full information revelation.
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results the higher ex ante efficiency, in terms of social welfare, of transparency
even over partial disclosure. The intuition is the same as above.
Ex ante efficiency (or even Pareto dominance) thus clearly and univocally
selects the separating equilibrium whenever it exists. Yet ex ante efficiency
is not (always) a good selection criterion in the present context, because,
whenever t ∈ [t∗(0, p), t∗(0, 1], government’s preferences over equilibria are
reversed in different states of the world: in booms the government would
prefer to be in a separating equilibrium, in which it reveals its private infor-
mation, thus boosting labor supply and welfare; in recessions it would prefer
to be in any other equilibrium, in which information is not revealed, so that
labor supply and welfare are higher than with perfect information.22 It is
therefore worthwhile to look at different equilibrium refinements.
For cheap talk games (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), standard refinements
based on Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), which restrict off-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs, have little power.23 Other refinements, explicitly introduced
to select equilibria in cheap talk games, are the No Incentive to Separate
(NITS) criterion by Chen et al. (2008) and the Neologism-Proof equilibrium
by Farrell (1993).24 The NITS criterion requires that the ‘lowest type’ of
sender does at least as well in equilibrium as it would if it could fully reveal
its type (and the receiver responded optimally). The idea is that, if this
condition does not hold, then the ‘lowest type’ of sender would have an in-
centive to separate and would find a way to fully reveal its type, and since the
receiver would understand such incentive, this revelation would be credible
and would be used, thus breaking the equilibrium under consideration. In the
present context, an equilibrium satisfies NITS if in recessions social welfare
is (weakly) higher in equilibrium than it would be if workers were perfectly
22For the proof of this claim, see Remark 3. The fact that t∗(0, p) < t∗(0, 1) is proved
analytically for δ ∈ {1.5, 2} in Appendix B and it can also be shown numerically for a
great variety of parameter constellations.
23This is true, for instance, for the Intuitive Criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987) and the
Forward Induction Equilibrium by Cho (1987). To see this, notice that there always exist
babbling equilibria, in which both signals are sent with strictly positive probability (and
receive the same interpretation), so that all beliefs are formed along the equilibrium path
of play.
24Both refinements are introduced for (two player) cheap talk games, with infinite type and
message spaces. By contrast, our game features a continuum of workers and just two types
and messages. None of these differences appears to matter for the following argument.
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informed about the recession (and responded optimally).25 The following
remark shows that the NITS criterion, while ruling out some equilibria, is
not very selective in our context.
Remark 3 (NITS)
The separating and semi-separating equilibria satisfy NITS.
Babbling and pooling equilibria satisfy NITS if and only if t ≥ t∗(0, p).
Proof Let θ = −ϑ. Social welfare under workers’ optimal response
to perfect information is W S(−ϑ) = ∫ B
b
{
(β − ϑ)`Sβ(−ϑ)−
[`Sβ (−ϑ)]δ
δ
}
dF (β),
where `Sβ(−ϑ) = (1 − t)
1
δ−1 (β − ϑ) 1δ−1 . The separating equilibrium satisfies
NITS, since workers, upon receiving message L, are indeed perfectly informed
about the recession (µ = 0) and respond optimally according to (1). Thus so-
cial welfare in recessions at the separating equilibrium is exactly W S(−ϑ). At
a semi-separating equilibrium, µ = 0 and in recessions the government ran-
domizes, implying that social welfare is W S(−ϑ) as well. Thus, also the semi-
separating equilibrium satisfies NITS. At any pooling or babbling equilib-
rium social welfare in recessions is W P (−ϑ) = ∫ B
b
[
(β − ϑ)`Pβ −
(`Pβ )
δ
δ
]
dF (β),
where `Pβ = (1−t)
1
δ−1
(
β + θ¯
) 1
δ−1 and θ¯ = pϑ−(1−p)ϑ. Pooling and babbling
equilibria satisfy NITS if and only if W P (−ϑ) ≥ W S(−ϑ). Using equations
(2) and (3), we have that W P (−ϑ) ≥ W S(−ϑ) ⇐⇒ [Z(t) ≤ 0 for µ = 0
and ν = p] ⇐⇒ t ≥ t∗(0, p).
The intuition for the result on pooling and babbling equilibria is as fol-
lows. Social welfare in recessions is an inverted-U-shaped function of labor
supply. For zero taxes, transparency allows to reach the first best, whereas
hiding information implies overwork. As taxes increase, labor supply and
welfare under transparency decrease, whereas overwork under information
hiding decreases, thus raising the associated welfare. As long as t < t∗(0, p),
the welfare cost of under-work under transparency is lower than the welfare
cost of over-work under information hiding, but as t ≥ t∗(0, p), the reverse
is true. Unfortunately, NITS is only selective for very low tax rates. For
instance, if t ∈ [t∗(0, p), t∗(0, 1)], there exist separating, pooling, babbling
and possibly also semi-separating equilibria, and all of them satisfy NITS.
25There is no ambiguity here about the fact that the ‘lowest type’ is a government in
recession.
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Farrell (1993) proposes the stronger refinement of Neologism Proof, based
on the idea that, if a set of ‘types’ (here, states of the world) existed, with
the two characteristics that types belonging to this set were able, through a
neologism, to communicate “My type belongs to this set”, and that precisely
those types in the set would strictly gain, relative to equilibrium, from the
best response to the information that they belong to that set, then this would
destroy an equilibrium, since the neologism could be interpreted according
to its literal meaning and would thus be used. In our context, an equilibrium
is Neologism Proof if neither in booms nor in recessions social welfare, rela-
tive to the equilibrium, would be (strictly) higher if workers were perfectly
informed about the true state of the world (and responded optimally).
Proposition 5 (Neologism Proof)
The separating equilibrium is the only Neologism Proof equilibrium.
Proof At a separating equilibrium, workers are perfectly informed about
the true state of the world and respond optimally, according to (1), bas-
ing their labor supply choices on µ = 0 in recessions and on ν = 1 in
booms. So the separating equilibrium is indeed Neologism Proof. At any
other equilibrium, social welfare would be strictly higher in booms, relative
to equilibrium, if workers were perfectly informed. So no other equilibrium
is Neologism Proof.
An often raised concern is that the Neologism Proof criterion rules out too
many equilibria, so that a Neologism Proof equilibrium may even fail to exist.
This happens in our case as well whenever the separating equilibrium does
not exist, that is, for t > t∗(0, 1). In this case, if t∗(0, p) ≤ t∗(0, 1), we also
have that non informative equilibria survive NITS. This means that, in this
model, non informative equilibria should be taken seriously. Yet, whenever
the separating equilibrium exists, the Neologism Proof criterion univocally
and convincingly selects it.
3.3 Transparency, shocks and inequality
On the basis of its robustness, we should expect the economy to coordinate
on the separating equilibrium whenever it exists. Therefore, the main com-
parative statics exercise amounts to investigate how the relevant threshold
for its existence, t∗(0, 1), moves in response to parameter or distributional
changes. In light of Propositions 2 and 5, we have the following remark.
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Remark 4 (Equilibrium transparency for low tax distortions)
Equilibrium government information is transparent whenever t ≤ t∗(0, 1).
We refer to the tax rate interval [0, t∗(0, 1)] as to the support of trans-
parency, and say that parameter or distributional changes favor (reduce)
transparency if they increase (decrease) t∗(0, 1).26
Proposition 6 (Effects of shock magnitude)
For any parameter constellation and distributional assumption, an increase
in shock magnitude, ϑ, favors transparency.
Proof Given posterior beliefs µ = 0 and ν = 1, and exploiting the
fact that (β − ϑ) = (β + ϑ − 2ϑ), from equation (2) we can derive ∂Z(t)
∂ϑ
=
δ−1+t
δ−1
∫ B
b
[
(β + ϑ)
1
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) 1δ−1
]
dF (β) + 2ϑ
δ−1
∫ B
b
(β + ϑ)
2−δ
δ−1dF (β) > 0.
In light of Remark 4, Proposition 6 tells us that, to have transparency
in equilibrium, what matters is that tax distortions are small relative to
the importance of aggregate shocks. This is due to the fact that credible
and benevolent governments face a trade-off in recessions: they can hide
private information on negative aggregate shocks to stimulate the economy
and compensate for suboptimal labor supply due to taxes, but if they do so,
they impose an information distortion. When taxes are low relative to the
importance of aggregate shocks, the costs of overwork caused by cheating in
recessions exceed the costs of under-supply of labor due to taxes, and the
government reveals its private information. When taxes are high relative to
the importance of aggregate shocks, the reverse is true. An increase in shock
magnitude raises the distortion caused by information hiding in recessions,
relative to the tax distortion suffered under transparency. It thus favors
transparency.
Notice that while shock magnitude is important, concerning shock fre-
quency we have the following remark.
Remark 5 (Effects of shock frequency)
For any parameter constellation and distributional assumption, the frequency
of booms and recessions is irrelevant for transparency.
26Recall from equations (2) and (3) that t∗(0, 1) in is obtained by equating to zero Z(t) for
posterior beliefs µ = 0 and ν = 1. Recall as well that the first term of Z(t) reflects the
overall leisure utility gain caused by announcing L, relative to H, in recessions; the second
term reflects the corresponding overall consumption utility loss.
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Proof Just observe that t∗(0, 1) is determined by the welfare comparison
between announcing L and H, conditional upon being in recession.
It is interesting to observe that this implies no discontinuity of equi-
librium informational policy as fluctuations vanish. In particular, suppose
t > t∗(0, 1), so the government is non informative in equilibrium. As p ap-
proaches 1, the economy is almost always in booms, the government always
announces H and the corresponding posterior belief ν = p also converges
to 1, so essentially we have truth-telling. The non informative equilibrium
converges to the informative one, since posterior beliefs are based on the
prior distribution of aggregate shocks, which becomes degenerate. Similarly,
as p approaches 0, the economy is almost always in recession, the govern-
ment always announces H, but now the corresponding posterior belief ν = p
converges to 0, so essentially the equilibrium meaning of H, as interpreted
by the agents, is “We are in recession”, and again we have truth-telling, so
no discontinuity. The only difference is that, if H has a natural meaning
“We are in boom”, in this case its equilibrium meaning does not coincide
with its natural meaning. Indeed, the government keeps saying “We are in
boom”, but since rational individuals know the prior distribution of aggre-
gate shocks, they do not believe such announcement and rather interpret it
according to their prior knowledge. But since the government knows this, it
lies knowing that it will not be believed and that individuals are essentially
perfectly informed anyway, which is what the government cares about.
Let us now consider the effects of inequality on transparency. In the next
proposition, we use Lorenz dominance (second order stochastic dominance)
as a criterion to establish whether a distribution has more inequality than
another one.
Proposition 7 (Effects of inequality)
For any parameter constellation and distributional assumption, the effects of
skill inequality on transparency depend on labor supply elasticity. In particu-
lar, consider a shift from skill distribution F to a more unequal distribution
G, dominated by F with respect to second order stochastic dominance.
• If γ = 1, such increase in inequality has no effects on transparency.
• If γ < 1, it favors transparency.
• If γ > 1, letting γˆ = 2
1−t∗(0,1) > 2, we have that γ ∈ (1, γˆ] is a sufficient
condition for it to reduce transparency.
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Proof Given posterior beliefs µ = 0 and ν = 1, from equation (2), we
can write
Z(t) =
∫ B
b
z(β)dF (β),
where
z(β) =
1− t
δ
[
(β + ϑ)
δ
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) δδ−1
]
− (β−ϑ)
[
(β + ϑ)
1
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) 1δ−1
]
.
By Jensen’s inequality, if z(β) is a convex function of β at t = t∗(0, 1), then
an increase in inequality (in the distribution of productivity) will determine
a rise in Z(t) and consequently a rise in t∗(0, 1). By contrast, if z(β) is
concave at t = t∗(0, 1), then inequality will reduce t∗(0, 1). The proposition
is then a corollary of Lemma 4 in Appendix, which investigates how the
convexity or concavity of z(β) depends on δ. To see this, just recall that
γ = 1
δ−1 , so that γ Q 1 ⇐⇒ δ R 2. Moreover, t∗(0, 1) ∈ (0, 1) and, for any
t ∈ (0, 1), δ ≥ 3−t
2
⇐⇒ γ ≤ 2
1−t .
First notice that most of the literature on information transparency as-
sumes γ = 1 (which means linear labor supply) and thus assumes away the
effects of inequality. We elaborate below on the special case of linear labor
supply. Yet the general picture is that inequality matters for government
transparency, and the way it does so depends on the shape of the labor sup-
ply curve. In particular, for plausible values of labor supply elasticity (i.e.,
for γ < 1), inequality favors transparency.
To grasp the intuition for this result, notice that t∗(0, 1) depends on the
welfare comparison between (credibly) revealing and not revealing informa-
tion about a recession. Given welfare convexity, inequality raises welfare
under both communication regimes, so the comparison depends on whether
inequality raises welfare faster under transparency than under information
hiding. Given our preferences, while production is always convex in ability,
labor supply is concave whenever it is rigid (γ < 1). In this case, in recessions
an increase in inequality lowers aggregate (or, which is the same, average,
across the population) labor supply and raises aggregate (or average) pro-
duction and welfare. Transparency in recessions raises leisure and reduces
consumption, relative to information hiding, for each individual. Both the
individual utility gain from transparency due to higher leisure and that from
information hiding due to higher consumption, relative to the other commu-
nication regime, are convex in ability. In Proposition 7 we prove that, for
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γ < 1 (and for any tax rate), also their difference, i.e., the overall individual
utility gain from transparency, relative to information hiding, is convex in
ability. In other words, with rigid labor supply, the leisure component pre-
vails on the consumption component in determining (for any tax rate) the
convexity of the relative utility gain to transparency. Thus an increase in
inequality indeed raises welfare in recessions faster under transparency than
under information hiding, and so it expands the support for transparency. By
contrast, for elastic labor supply, the consumption component prevails over
the leisure component in determining the concavity of the relative utility gain
to transparency, thus the result is reversed.27
Last, an analytical characterization of the direct effects of labor supply
elasticity on t∗(0, 1), for any possible constellation of other parameters and
for any ability distribution, is hard to obtain. Numerical investigation under
the assumption of a Pareto distribution of β yields the following remark.
Remark 6 (Effects of labor supply elasticity)
Whether labor supply elasticity favors or not transparency cannot be estab-
lished in general terms. For high but plausible values of inequality (Gini index
above 1/3), it tends to harm transparency. For lower values of inequality, in
turn, it tends to have a non linear effect, initially favoring and then harming
transparency. In this case, the quantitative effect appears to be small.
4 The Politico-Economic Equilibrium
We have considered so far the informational policy of the government for a
given tax rate. We have obtained that whether or not the government is
transparent critically depends on the existing tax rate being above or below
of a threshold level. The value of this threshold turns out to depend on the
level of inequality. But, the ruling tax rate will plausibly also depend on the
degree of inequality. This is certainly the case when the tax rate is chosen
by majority voting. Therefore, in order to complete the model we need
to examine the politico-economic equilibrium of the economy, in which the
outcome of majority voting is consistent with the conditions for the existence
of a given informational policy.
27In detail, we show that this is true for any tax rate when γ ∈ (1, 2], and that it continues
to hold at t = t∗(0, 1) at least for an interval of γ > 2. While we cannot offer a proof of
the result for any possible higher value of labor supply elasticity, such values are indeed
contrary to any empirically plausible estimate of γ.
27
We now proceed to the analysis of the choice of tax rates under major-
ity voting, focusing on pure strategy equilibria of the announcements game
and assuming skewed skill distributions with the median below the mean.
Denoting by βm the median skill, i.e., F (βm) =
1
2
, we assume βm ≤ E(β).
We follow the standard analysis by Meltzer and Richard (1981). As we have
already mentioned, the alternative informational policies generate distinct
regimes. Under truthful information individuals choose labor supply in a
regime of income fluctuations with perfect certainty about the state of the
world. In the other regime the government’s announcements are not infor-
mative and individuals are uncertain about the true state of the world when
they make labor supply choices. We first solve for the majoritarian tax under
each informational policy and then examine the existence and properties of
the politico-economic equilibrium.
4.1 Voting over taxes
In a model which is essentially identical to ours, fluctuations and our as-
sumption of separable preferences, Meltzer and Richard (1981) prove that, if
consumption and leisure are normal goods, then preferences over taxes are
monotonically decreasing in individual income, so that the decisive voter will
be the voter with median income. In particular, they show that the tax rate
chosen by the median voter equalizes the elasticity of mean income to the tax
rate (in absolute value) and the complement to one of the ratio of median to
mean income.
We differ from their model in that we introduce fluctuations due to ag-
gregate productivity shocks and, if the government is non informative, un-
certainty about individual productivity. Neither of these differences modifies
their result, once we reformulate it in terms of expected income. In our model,
as in theirs, consumption is a normal good. By contrast, our assumptions
on preferences eliminate any income effect on labor supply, so that leisure is
neither normal nor inferior. Yet notice that the only role of the assumption
that leisure is a normal good is to assure that, for any tax rate, there is a
unique level of transfers that balances the government budget. If leisure is
a normal good, this holds because transfers reduce labor supply and hence
mean income (see Meltzer and Richard, 1981, pp. 919-920). In our model,
mean income is independent of transfers, so this result holds as well.
We can therefore apply the standard analysis of Meltzer and Richard
(1981) and obtain the tax rate selected by the decisive voter under the two
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information regimes. Let superscripts S and P denote a fully informative
and a non informative regime, respectively. Since income is monotonic in
individual skills, the median income is the income of an individual with
median skill, βm, and this is indeed the decisive voter. In regime i = S, P ,
the ex ante expected median income is y¯iβm and the per capita expected
income is E(y¯iβ) =
∫ B
b
y¯iβdF (β). Denoting K(x) ≡
∫ B
b
(β + x)
δ
δ−1dF (β), for
x = ϑ,−ϑ, θ¯, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 8 (Majoritarian tax rate)
Given the government’s information policy, the median voter selects a tax
rate ti ∈ (0, 1) such that
− t
i
E(y¯iβ)
dE(y¯iβ)
dt
= 1− y¯
i
βm
E(y¯iβ)
,
where i = S if the government is informative and and i = P if it is non
informative. Explicit calculation yields
tS = 1− 1
δ − (δ − 1)p(βm+ϑ)
δ
δ−1 +(1−p)(βm−ϑ)
δ
δ−1
pK(ϑ)+(1−p)K(−ϑ)
,
tP = 1− 1
δ − (δ − 1) (βm+θ¯)
δ
δ−1
K(θ¯)
.
Proof Although the characterization in terms of median and mean in-
come immediately follows from Meltzer and Richard (1981), we provide an
explicit derivation. Recall from the proof of Proposition 3 that, for i = S, P
and for any β and t, the ex ante expected level of individual indirect utility in
information regime i is u¯iβ =
(
δ−1
δ
)
(1−t)y¯iβ+tE(y¯iβ). Taking the first deriva-
tive with respect to t, and observing that (1 − t)dy¯
i
β
dt
= − ( 1
δ−1
)
y¯iβ, we have
the first order condition
du¯iβ
dt
= E(y¯iβ)− y¯iβ + ti
dE(y¯iβ)
dt
= 0. This characterizes
the most preferred tax rate (for β) whenever labor supply is strictly positive
(which holds for every β in our model) and whenever a solution exists in the
range t ∈ (0, 1). Observe that du¯
i
β
dt
< 0 as t is sufficiently close to 1, since
labor supply and income become close to 0. So we necessarily have ti < 1.
Moreover, since
du¯iβ
dt
can be written as the product of (1−t) 1δ−1 and a term Qiβ
that is strictly decreasing in t, it follows that, if an interior solution exists,
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it is unique and it defines a maximum; otherwise, the most preferred tax is
zero. Specifically, for i = S, P , we can write
du¯iβ
dt
= (1− t) 1δ−1Qiβ, where QSβ =[
1− t
(δ−1)(1−t)
]
[pK(ϑ) + (1− p)K(−ϑ)]−
[
p(β + ϑ)
δ
δ−1 + (1− p)(β − ϑ) δδ−1
]
and QPβ = K(θ¯) −
(
β + θ¯
) δ
δ−1 − t
(δ−1)(1−t)K(θ¯). Let t
i(β) be the solution by
t of Qiβ = 0. For the median voter such values are t
i = ti(βm), as expressed
in the proposition. To see that ti > 0, notice that ti(β) is strictly decreas-
ing in β. Moreover, using standard properties of convex functions, we know
that pK(ϑ) + (1 − p)K(−ϑ) > p(E(β) + ϑ) δδ−1 + (1 − p)(E(β) − ϑ) δδ−1 and
[E(β) + θ¯]
δ
δ−1 <
∫ B
b
(β + θ¯)
δ
δ−1dF (β). So ti(E(β)) > 0. Hence, βm ≤ E(β)
implies that ti = ti(βm) ≥ ti(E(β)) > 0, for i = S, P .
4.2 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
We have just determined the tax rate selected by the median voter for each
given government information regime. In the previous sections we estab-
lished that, given the tax rate, the equilibrium of the announcement game
is informative if t ≤ t∗(0, 1), and non informative otherwise. We now ver-
ify whether the tax rate selected by the median voter under each possible
information regime is indeed consistent with that regime. The tax rate tS
and an informative policy by the government constitute a politico-economic
equilibrium if and only if tS ≤ t∗(0, 1). In turn, tP and a non-informative
policy constitute a politico-economic equilibrium if and only if tP > t∗(0, 1).
The conditions for these inequalities to hold are hard to express for a
general value of δ. Both the threshold t∗(0, 1) and the majoritarian tax rate
depend on the degree of inequality. The wider the gap between median and
mean income, the higher the tax rate preferred by the median voter. However,
as we have seen in the previous Section, the effect of higher inequality on the
threshold tax level depends on δ. When δ > 2 inequality raises the threshold
level and when δ < 2 inequality lowers this threshold level.
For the remainder of this Section we restrict to the case of δ = 2, which
corresponds to linear labor supply. Moreover, for clarity of exposition, we
focus on the standard case of white noise shocks, that is, with θ¯ = 0. The
extension to the case of θ¯ 6= 0 is straightforward and is discussed below,
together with the implications for the case of δ 6= 2. Denote by  ≡ ϑ
E(β)
the
relative size of the shock; by v ≡ V (β)
E(β)2
the normalized skill variance, where
30
V (β) =
∫ B
b
[β − E(β)]2dF (β); and by ψ ≡
[
βm
E(β)
]2
the square of the median
to mean ratio. Using subscript L for the case of linear labor supply, we then
have t∗(0, 1) = t∗L(0, 1) and t
i = tiL for i = S, P , where
t∗L(0, 1) = ,
tSL =
1− ψ + v
2− ψ + 2v + 2 ,
tPL =
1− ψ + v
2− ψ + 2v .
The case of δ = 2 is a useful benchmark because the threshold tax is
independent of inequality and hence we just need to examine the conditions
under which the chosen tax will be larger or smaller than the fix value .28
So the larger the relative shock magnitude, the wider the range of taxes that
induce an informative policy by the government. Concerning tSL and t
P
L , it is
immediate to derive the following remarks, which also hold for θ¯ 6= 0.
Remark 7 (Effects of shocks and inequality on taxes)
Both tSL and t
P
L are increasing in the normalized skill variance v and decreas-
ing in the (squared) median to mean ratio ψ. Moreover, tSL is decreasing in
the normalized shock magnitude , whereas tPL is independent of .
Remark 8 (Comparison between tSL and t
P
L)
tSL ≤ tPL , with equality if and only if v =∞. The distance between tPL and tSL
increases in .
In words, inequality raises the tax rate selected by the median voter un-
der each information regime. The median voter chooses lower taxes in the
informative than in the non-informative regime. The difference in majori-
tarian tax rates between these two cases is increasing in the importance of
information (or, which is the same, of aggregate shocks).
Observe that, for any distribution, any value of ψ ∈ (0, 1) imposes a
lower bound (
√
ψ − 1)2 to the values of v compatible with it.29 So any
28See Remark 9 in Appendix B. Notice that t∗L(0, 1) =  also holds for θ¯ 6= 0.
29For any F (β), given the squared median to mean ratio ψ, since the normalized variance v
is a convex function of β, it is minimized by concentrating 12 of the normalized distribution
on
√
ψ and 12 on (2−
√
ψ). Hence, v ≥ (√ψ − 1)2.
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feasible combination of v and ψ has to satisfy the restriction v ≥ (√ψ− 1)2.
We are now ready to state existence and characterize the politico-economic
equilibrium.
Proposition 9 (Politico-economic equilibrium)
Assume δ = 2, θ¯ = 0, and ψ ≤ 1. Let g(ψ, ) ≡ 1−
1−2ψ − 1. For any ability
distribution and any feasible combination of , v and ψ, a politico-economic
equilibrium exists.
• If  ≥ 1
2
, then the equilibrium is informative, with tax rate tSL.
• If  < 1
2
, then the following holds.
– for v ≤ g(ψ, ), the equilibrium is informative, with tax rate tSL;
– for v > g(ψ, )+ 
3
1−2 , the equilibrium is non informative, with tax
rate tPL ;
– for v ∈
(
g(ψ, ), g(ψ, ) + 
3
1−2
]
, then both an informative and a
non informative equilibrium exist, with respective tax rate tSL and
tPL .
Proof For  ≥ 1
2
, we have tSL ≤ tPL ≤ t∗L(0, 1). Now consider  < 12 . In
this case, tSL ≤ t∗L(0, 1) ⇐⇒ v ≤ g(ψ, ) + 
3
1−2 and t
P
L > t
∗
L(0, 1) ⇐⇒ v >
g(ψ, ).
Proposition 9 conveys the following message. Because the median voter
is never going to select a tax rate on the decreasing side of the Laffer curve,
the majoritarian tax rate is at most 1
2
. If t∗L(0, 1) ≥ 12 , the majoritarian tax is
necessarily below it and the unique equilibrium is informative, with tax rate
tSL. In turn, if t
∗
L(0, 1) <
1
2
, then at low levels of inequality the majoritarian
tax rate is below t∗L(0, 1), independently of government information policy,
so the unique equilibrium is again informative, with tax rate tSL; at high
levels of inequality the majoritarian tax rate is instead above t∗L(0, 1), again
independently of government information policy, so the unique equilibrium
is non informative, with tax rate tPL ; at intermediate levels of inequality, in
turn, we have that tSL ≤ t∗L(0, 1) < tPL , so that there are two equilibria: one
in which the government is informative and the majoritarian tax rate is tSL,
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and one in which the government is non informative and the majoritarian
tax rate is tPL .
Given the relative importance of aggregate shocks  (and therefore given
t∗L(0, 1)), the measure on inequality that determines what kind of equilibrium
exists depends on two features of the skill distribution: its normalized vari-
ance v and the (squared) median to mean ratio ψ. Increasing (in a feasible
way) either the variance or the distance between the median and the mean
(or both) moves towards higher taxes and non informative equilibria.
Figure 2 gives a qualitative representation of these results, given  < 1
2
.
The feasible combinations of v and ψ satisfy v ≥ (√ψ−1)2; among those, the
informative equilibrium exists in the area below the upper solid line, whereas
the non informative equilibrium exists in the area above the lower solid line;
between the two solid lines, they both exist.
Figure 2: The politico-economic equilibrium
under the assumptions of Proposition 9, with  < 1
2
.
Comparative statics on shock magnitude and inequality is then straight-
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forward. Since we already discussed how majoritarian taxes depend on , v
and ψ, and since for  ≥ 1
2
there is (always) a unique equilibrium (which is
informative), we limit our discussion to the case of  < 1
2
and to the effects of
parameter and distributional changes on the existence range of informative
and non informative politico-economic equilibria.
Proposition 10 (Effects of shock magnitude)
Let  < 1
2
. Under the assumptions of Proposition 9, an increase in shock
magnitude 
• expands the existence range of informative equilibria;
• reduces the existence range of non informative equilibria.
Proof Given  < 1
2
, consider first g(ψ, ) + 
3
1−2 as a function of ψ. A
rise in  raises its vertical intercept and makes it steeper, thus expanding the
set of feasible pairs (ψ, v) such that tSL ≤ t∗L(0, 1). Now consider g(ψ, ) as a
function of ψ. A rise in  makes it steeper, although its vertical intercept is
always g(0, ) = −1, for any  ∈ (0, 1). Thus a rise in  reduces the set of
feasible pairs (ψ, v) such that tPL > t
∗
L(0, 1).
The effects of a rise in  are represented in Figure 2 by a shift from the
solid to the dashed lines.30 In turn, the effects of a rise in inequality, as
measured by the (normalized) variance or by the (squared) median to mean
ratio, are described in the following proposition.31
Proposition 11 (Effects of inequality)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 9, the following holds.
• For any  < 1
2
, if inequality is sufficiently low, the informative equilib-
rium exists. To be precise, there is a positive measure set of feasible
pairs (ψ, v), sufficiently close to (1, 0), where it exists.
30Notice that, while Figure 2 is accurate in the qualitative features, quantitatively it over-
expands the range of multiple equilibria and overlooks the convergence of the lower solid
and dashed lines at ψ = 0. This is done to make it easier to read.
31Since for normalized distributions a shift to a dominated distribution with respect to
second order stochastic dominance implies an increase in (normalized) variance, we could
easily rephrase Proposition 11 in terms of such increases in inequality, as we did in Propo-
sition 7. The variance formulation is just more straightforward for the case of linear labor
supply.
34
• Starting from one such pair, there exists a sufficient increase in v, such
that only the non-informative politico-economic equilibrium exists.
Proof Let  < 1
2
. Both the slope and the vertical intercept of g(ψ, ) +
3
1−2 , considered as a function of ψ, tend to infinity as  → 12 . In turn,
g(1, ) + 
3
1−2 =
2+1
1−2→ 0 as → 0. Then both results are a direct corollary
of Proposition 9 and the following discussion.
Given δ = 2 and θ¯ = 0, the above analysis yields two results. First,
inequality does not affect transparency when aggregate shocks are very im-
portant. This is due to the fact that majoritarian taxes cannot be too high,
because of the inverted-U shape of the Laffer curve. Second, inequality clearly
reduces transparency at lower levels of shock magnitude, because it raises
majoritarian tax rates, eventually driving them outside the range, for which
transparency is an equilibrium.32
Let us now consider the generalizability of the results obtained in this sec-
tion. In the case of θ¯ 6= 0, the only difference would be that the majoritarian
tax rate in each information regime would be decreasing in the frequency of
booms p, so that, given δ = 2, a rise in p expands the support for transparent
equilibria and shrinks the support for non-informative equilibria. While this
would change the precise formulation of the thresholds in Proposition 9, it
would not modify any other qualitative result.
If δ < 2, inequality raises majoritarian taxes and reduces the threshold
t∗(0, 1), so that it unequivocally reduces transparency. The qualitative anal-
ysis in that case is likely to be very similar to the one we conducted. If δ > 2,
in turn, inequality raises both majoritarian taxes and t∗(0, 1). By continuity,
it seems that the qualitative results of our present analysis should extend to
that case, at least as long as δ is not too high. For very high values of δ, in
turn, we expect that, coherently with the result in Proposition 7, inequality
favors transparency even when the endogeneity of majoritarian taxes is taken
into account. Indeed, as δ → ∞, labor supply becomes perfectly rigid, the
tax distortion disappears and the government has no incentive whatsoever
to manipulate information.
32Recall that, by Proposition 7, for δ = 2 such range is independent of inequality.
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5 Comments and implications
We now take stock of our results and discuss a number of implications.
• Governments tend to truthfully reveal information when tax distortions
are low. This is a direct implication of Proposition 2 and it clearly fol-
lows from the fact that, as is usual in second best environments, an
additional distortion (here, hiding information in recessions) can be
used to correct for an existing one. Specifically, when tax distortions
are high, governments have an incentive to cheat in recessions, in order
to stimulate labor supply and compensate for its suboptimal level; yet,
by so doing, they lose credibility. When tax distortions are low, hid-
ing information about a recession induces (suboptimal) overwork. If
taxes are low enough, in recessions the welfare costs of overwork under
information hiding are higher than the costs of underwork under infor-
mation revelation. So for low taxes, governments have an incentive to
reveal information, thus gaining credibility.
• All else equal, governments tend to reveal information when aggregate
shocks are big, whereas they tend to hide information when shocks are
small. The intuition is exactly the same as for the effects of tax distor-
tions, since what matters is the relative magnitude of the underwork
distortion caused by taxes and the information distortion caused by
cheating in recessions. Small shocks mean that, by hiding information
about a recession, the government provides just a small stimulus to
labor supply. With positive taxes, and therefore with under-supply of
labor, it is always the case that a sufficiently small increase in labor
supply raises welfare. In turn, when aggregate shocks are big, hiding
information about a recession provides a powerful stimulus to labor
supply. If the shock is big enough, this generates overwork, whose wel-
fare costs increase in the magnitude of the shock and eventually become
bigger than the costs of underwork under information revelation.
• Inequality in pre-tax income distribution has both a direct and an in-
direct effect on transparency. The direct effect is obtained holding
fixed the tax rate, whereas the indirect one works through changes in
the tax rate. According to the direct effect, inequality favors trans-
parency when labor supply is rigid, has the opposite effect when it is
elastic (at least for a substantial range elasticities), and is irrelevant
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for transparency when labor supply is linear. Much of the literature
on government information transparency assumes a linear labor supply,
thus assuming away the effects of inequality. In contrast, our results
show that, for plausible values of labor supply elasticity, in recessions
an increase in inequality raises welfare faster under transparency than
under information hiding, so that, when we look at the direct effect
alone, transparency and inequality tend to be complements.
• Yet, if inequality is also associated to higher tax rates, the result might
be reversed. When we close the model with an endogenous determina-
tion of the tax rate, we show that the median voter selects higher taxes,
the higher the level of inequality. So the indirect effect of inequality
is that it reduces transparency. Combined with the previous results,
this tells us that inequality unequivocally reduces transparency under
either linear of elastic labor supply, whereas it generates two contrast-
ing forces under the more plausible case of rigid labor supply: while it
provides a direct incentive for transparency, it also raises taxes, which
provides the opposite incentive. The overall result is hard to establish
in general terms. Beyond the median voter model, if the tax determina-
tion process is little sensitive to inequality, we should expect inequality
and transparency to be positively correlated, whereas if the reverse is
true, they are likely to be negatively correlated.
• An empirical implication of our model is that, all else equal, output
and hours worked fluctuate more when the government is transpar-
ent. This is consistent with the evidence provided by Demertzis and
Hughes-Hallett (2007). At the same time, the government tends to be
transparent when aggregate shocks are relatively small. This means
that it is not immediate to predict whether, in absolute terms (i.e., for-
getting about the ceteris paribus condition), the magnitude of fluctu-
ations should be positively or negatively correlated with government’s
information transparency.
• Insofar as output volatility is higher in an informative equilibrium and
transparency in more likely for lower taxes, our model offers a possible
explanation for the recently uncovered negative relationship between
taxation and output volatility (Debrun et al., 2008).
• Another empirical implication is that we should expect credibility and
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reliability of government’s information to be higher in those countries
that exhibit low taxes, high aggregate shocks and high inequality (at
least to the extent that taxes are not very responsive to inequality).
Examples might include governments in small open economies, which
are typically hit by bigger shocks, governments in periods of high fluc-
tuations (e.g., the present global crisis), and governments in countries
with a rather unequal distribution of human capital (e.g., the U.S.).
Yet, rather than to explain individual cases, our contribution is de-
signed to highlight the working of a few (relevant and new) theoreti-
cal mechanisms, which empirical investigations of the determinants of
transparent government communication should keep in mind.
• A note of caution for empirical work on government communication
is that we show that transparency is ex-ante Pareto dominant. So, al-
though it is not an equilibrium when tax distortions are relatively high,
governments might still find a way to tie their hands and commit to
transparency, for instance through an appropriate design of indepen-
dent statistical institutes.
• From the theoretical point of view, observe that precisely when the
government lies, individuals are ex post happy that it lied. Therefore,
the fact that the government’s private information is ex post verifiable
poses no problems of possible continuations of the game in which lies
are sanctioned.
• Our theory highlights the limits of equilibrium transparency when the
government is benevolent, individuals are rational and no credible com-
mitment is possible. In particular, it shows that transparency is not
an equilibrium when tax distortions are high. Let us now discuss a few
possible extensions, which we leave for future research. It would be in-
teresting to investigate the interaction of opportunistic and benevolent
motives on the side of government. For instance, an incumbent govern-
ment might want to be over-optimistic to influence individuals’ beliefs
on its ability, beyond the motive emphasized in this paper. While this
would provide an extra incentive to hide bad news, we expect that it
would not change our main results.
• While we have enriched the standard cheap talk game with a continuum
of receivers, we have simplified its state and message space to just two
38
values. An extension to the continuum case would allow to analyze the
degree of precision of the information transmitted by the government.
While this may be an interesting extension, we feel that the simple case
of two states and messages is better suited to convey our main intuition
in a clear way.
• Observe that the main message of the paper goes well beyond the spe-
cific application we study. First, one can imagine different mechanisms
of tax determination, without affecting the results of the first part of
the paper. Second, the general idea that the a benevolent government
may manipulate information to undo an existing distortion can be read-
ily applied to any kind of distortion, and not just to income taxation.
Third, the argument extends to any principal-agent problem, in which
the principal has private information on the relation between individ-
ual actions and results and can manipulate it to counterbalance the
agent’s suboptimal behavior.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies a model of government announcements about the future
state of economic activity. We find conditions for the emergence of informa-
tive and non-informative government communication regimes in an economy
characterized by persistent distortions and government private information.
The basic message of this paper is twofold. First, even a benevolent
government may be non-informative in an attempt to undo sufficiently high
distortions and induce higher labor supply. This casts doubts on the com-
monsense view according to which the lack of government information trans-
parency is simply a consequence of bad or corrupt bureaucrats. Second, we
show that the informative equilibrium outcome is ex ante Pareto-dominant.
This result suggests that in the presence of unremovable distortions, govern-
ments should commit to truthful communication. This provides a rationale
for independent national statistical offices.
We show that transparency is negatively associated with the extent of
distortions, while it is strengthened by the magnitude of shocks suffered
by the economy. Last, given tax rates, inequality has a direct effect on
government transparency, which is positive or negative depending on labor
supply elasticity. Yet, to the extent that inequality generates higher tax rates
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and therefore higher distortions, it also has an indirect effect, which reduces
transparency.
Appendices
A Convexity/concavity of z(β))
Lemma 4 (Convexity/concavity of z(β))
For any t ∈ (0, 1), the function of β
z(β) =
1− t
δ
[
(β + ϑ)
δ
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) δδ−1
]
− (β − ϑ)
[
(β + ϑ)
1
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) 1δ−1
]
is linear for δ = 2, strictly convex for δ > 2 and strictly concave for δ ∈[
3−t
2
, 2
)
.
Proof The first and second derivative of z(β) at a generic t ∈ (0, 1) are
z′(β) =
1
(δ − 1)
{
(2− δ − t)
[
(β + ϑ)
1
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) 1δ−1
]
+
−(β − ϑ)
[
(β + ϑ)
2−δ
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) 2−δδ−1
]}
,
z′′(β) =
1
(δ − 1)2
{
(3− 2δ − t)
[
(β + ϑ)
2−δ
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) 2−δδ−1
]
+
−(2− δ)(β − ϑ)
[
(β + ϑ)
3−2δ
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) 3−2δδ−1
]}
.
For δ = 2, z′′(β) = 0 for any t ∈ (0, 1), so z(β) is linear.
For δ = 3
2
, z′′(β) < 0 for any t ∈ (0, 1), so z(β) is concave.
For δ 6= 2, δ 6= 3
2
, we can re-write
z′′(β) =
(2− δ)
(δ − 1)2
[
(β + ϑ)
3−2δ
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) 3−2δδ−1
]
·
·
(3− 2δ − t)
[
(β + ϑ)
2−δ
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) 2−δδ−1
]
(2− δ)
[
(β + ϑ)
3−2δ
δ−1 − (β − ϑ) 3−2δδ−1
] − (β − ϑ)

and study the three sub-cases δ > 2, δ ∈ (3
2
, 2
)
, δ ∈ (1, 3
2
)
.
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For δ > 2, the sign of z′′(β) is the same as the sign of the term in curly
brackets. Let a0 = (β − ϑ)
3−2δ
δ−1 and a1 = (β + ϑ)
3−2δ
δ−1 , notice that a0 > a1
and consider the function g(a) =
(
3−2δ
2−δ
)
a
2−δ
3−2δ . Since it is concave, we have
g(a0)−g(a1)
a0−a1 > g
′(a0) = (β−ϑ). The left hand side in this inequality is the first
term in the curly brackets for t = 0, so that we have z′′(β) > 0 for t = 0.
Since ∂z
′′(β)
∂t
> 0, we have that for any t ∈ (0, 1), z′′(β) > 0.
For δ ∈ (3
2
, 2
)
, the sign of z′′(β) is opposite to the sign of the term in curly
brackets. We have 2−δ
3−2δ < 0, so g(a) is again concave, and again a0 > a1. So
g(a0)−g(a1)
a0−a1 > g
′(a0) = (β − ϑ) and z′′(β) < 0 for t = 0. Since ∂z′′(β)∂t < 0, we
have that for any t ∈ (0, 1), z′′(β) < 0.
For δ ∈ (1, 3
2
)
, using the fact that (β + ϑ)
2−δ
δ−1 = (β + ϑ)(β + ϑ)
3−2δ
δ−1 and
(β − ϑ) 2−δδ−1 = (β − ϑ)(β − ϑ) 3−2δδ−1 , and rearranging, we can write z′′(β) =
1
(δ−1)2
[
A(β − ϑ) 3−2δδ−1 −B(β + ϑ) 3−2δδ−1
]
, where A ≡ (δ + t − 1)(β − ϑ) and
B ≡ (δ+ t−1)β+ (3δ+ t−5)ϑ = A+ 2(2δ+ t−3)ϑ. Since δ ∈ (1, 3
2
)
implies
that (β − ϑ) 3−2δδ−1 < (β + ϑ) 3−2δδ−1 , and B > A ⇐⇒ 2δ + t > 3, we have that a
sufficient condition for z′′(β) < 0 is 3−t
2
≤ δ < 3
2
.
B Linear and quadratic labor supply
In this appendix we develop two specific examples, corresponding to the spe-
cial cases of linear and quadratic labor supply. For δ = 2, labor supply is
linear. Its wage elasticity, equal to 1, is in the upper range of most mi-
croeconometric estimates. For δ = 3
2
, labor supply is quadratic. Its wage
elasticity, equal to 2, is above most microeconometric estimates. For these
two cases, expression (3) simplifies considerably, since the ability distribution
F influences (3) only through its first two moments, E(β) and V (β). Recall
that we call  ≡ ϑ
E(β)
the relative importance of the aggregate shock and now
denote by η ≡ 1 + v = E(β2)
[E(β)]2
= [E(β)]
2+V (β)
[E(β)]2
the pre-tax wage dispersion.
We prove first in Lemma 5 a monotonicity result for t∗(µ, ν), which grants
existence of non babbling equilibria at any tax rate. Its implications are
drawn in Corollary 1.33 Remark 9 explicitly computes the relevant thresholds
33Numerical investigation shows that Lemma 5 and Corollary 1 generalize to a great number
of parameter constellations and distributional assumptions.
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for non babbling equilibria.
Lemma 5 (Monotonicity of t∗(µ, ν) for δ = 2 and δ = 3
2
)
If either δ = 2 or δ = 3
2
, then for any constellation of other parameters, any
ability distribution and any values of µ and ν such that 0 ≤ µ < ν ≤ 1,
∂t∗(µ, ν)
∂µ
> 0,
∂t∗(µ, ν)
∂ν
> 0.
Proof First observe that  ∈ (0, 1), due to 0 < ϑ < b, and that η > 1.
For δ = 2 and δ = 3
2
, expression (3) becomes t∗(µ, ν) = t∗L(µ, ν) and t
∗(µ, ν) =
t∗Q(µ, ν), respectively, where
t∗L(µ, ν) =
(µ+ ν)ϑ
(µ+ ν)ϑ+ E(β)− ϑ =
(µ+ ν)
(µ+ ν)+ (1− ) . (4)
t∗Q(µ, ν) =
(µ+ ν) + 2
[
4
3
(ν − µ)2 + 4µν − (µ+ ν)]
η + 2(µ+ ν − 1) + 2 [4
3
(ν − µ)2 + 4µν − 2(µ+ ν) + 1] .(5)
For δ = 2, both results are immediate to obtain from (4).
Now let δ = 3
2
and call D the denominator in (5). Explicit calculation yields
that ∂t
∗(µ,ν)
∂µ
and ∂t
∗(µ,ν)
∂ν
are respectively equal to the following expressions:
D−2 · { [1 +  (8
3
µ+ 4
3
ν − 1)] · [(η − 1) + (1− )2] + 4
3
µ(µ+ 2ν)3(1− )};
D−2 · { [1 +  (8
3
ν + 4
3
µ− 1)] · [(η − 1) + (1− )2] + 4
3
ν(ν + 2µ)3(1− )}.
∂t∗(µ,ν)
∂µ
> 0 and ∂t
∗(µ,ν)
∂ν
> 0 then follow from  ∈ (0, 1) and η > 1.
Corollary 1 (Non babbling equilibria for δ = 2 and δ = 3
2
)
If either δ = 2 or δ = 3
2
, then there exist three non empty tax intervals, such
that the following holds for non babbling equilibria.
• For t ∈ (0, t∗(0, p)), only the separating equilibrium exists.
• For t ∈ [t∗(0, p), t∗(0, 1)], both the separating and the pooling equilibrium
exist. Moreover, a semi-separating equilibrium exists if and only if
t = t∗
(
0, p
p+(1−p)ρ
)
.
• For t ∈ (t∗(0, 1), 1), only the pooling equilibrium exists.
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Proof The result is a corollary of Proposition 2 and Lemma 5, since
∀p ∈ (0, 1), ∀ρ ∈ (0, 1), t∗(0, p) < t∗
(
0, p
p+(1−p)ρ
)
< t∗(0, 1). Observe that
we focus here on the pooling equilibrium with µ = 0, because Lemma 5 im-
plies that, given p ∈ (0, 1) and either δ = 2 or δ = 3
2
, for any t ≥ t∗(0, p) we
can find beliefs µ ∈ [0, p) sufficiently low to sustain a pooling equilibrium.34
Remark 9 (t∗(0, p) and t∗(0, 1) for δ = 2 and δ = 3
2
)
From equations (4) and (5), the relevant thresholds in Corollary 1 are:
δ = 2 : t∗L(0, p) =
p
p+ (1− ) , t
∗
L(0, 1) = ,
δ =
3
2
: t∗Q(0, p) =
(4p2 − 3p) 2 + 3p
(4p2 − 6p+ 3) 2 − 6(1− p)+ 3η , t
∗
Q(0, 1) =
2 + 3
2 + 3η
.
Proposition 3 implies that, whenever it exists, the separating equilibrium
ex ante Pareto dominates any other equilibrium.35 Remark 3 and Lemma
5 imply that any equilibrium satisfies NITS, with the exception of babbling
equilibria for t < t∗(0, p); and Proposition 5 implies that the separating
equilibrium is the only Neologism Proof equilibrium, so that we should expect
it whenever it exists. Therefore, government information transparency should
be expected in equilibrium when t ≤ t∗(0, 1). From Remark 9, we have that
34Indeed, when an L message is interpreted as a sure signal that the true state of the world
is a recession, i.e., µ = 0, existence chances for a pooling equilibrium are highest.
35Explicit calculation yields the following welfare levels. Let θ¯ = pϑ − (1− p)ϑ be the ex-
pected value of θ according to prior beliefs. Denote ex ante social welfare in the separating
and in the pooling equilibrium as WSL and W
P
L , respectively, for δ = 2, and as W
S
Q and
WPQ , respectively, for δ =
3
2 . We then have
WSL =
1− t2
2
{
V (β) + [E(β)− ϑ]2 + 4pϑE(β)
}
,
WPL =
1− t2
2
{
V (β) +
[
E(β) + θ¯
]2}
,
WSQ =
1
3
(1− t)2(1 + 2t)
∫ B
b
[
(1− p)(β − ϑ)3 + p(β + ϑ)3] dF (β),
WPQ =
1
3
(1− t)2(1 + 2t)
∫ B
b
(
β + θ¯
)3
dF (β).
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the relevant threshold for transparency is t∗(0, 1) = t∗L(0, 1) and t
∗(0, 1) =
t∗Q(0, 1), in the case of linear and quadratic labor supply, respectively, where
t∗L(0, 1) = ,
t∗Q(0, 1) =
2 + 3
2 + 3η
.
The comparative statics implications of Propositions 6 and 7, namely that
shock magnitude always favors transparency, whereas inequality is irrele-
vant under linear labor supply and makes governments less reliable under
quadratic labor supply, can then be grasped by observing that
∂t∗L(0,1)
∂
> 0,
∂t∗Q(0,1)
∂
> 0,
∂t∗L(0,1)
∂η
= 0 and
∂t∗Q(0,1)
∂η
< 0.
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